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The Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization and Tankers:
A Case Study in the Effectiveness of International
Maritime Regulation
By ROBERT L. OTSEA, JR.
Member of the Class of 1978.
I. INTRODUCTION
N THE EARLY winter morning of December 15, 1976, the Argo
Merchant, an oil tanker of Liberian registry, ran aground off Nan-
tucket Island, spilling its entire cargo of crude oil into the Atlantic
Ocean.' During the following four weeks, more major tanker casualties
occurred than in any like period in tanker history. The Sansinea ex-
ploded in Los Angeles harbor, killing eleven people; the Grand Zenith,
a Panamanian tanker, was missing and presumed sunk with over
six million gallons of oil aboard; and the Olympic Gaines ran aground
in the Delaware River, spilling 134,000 gallons of oil.'-' This rash of
tanker casualties brought to the world's attention that not much
progress had been made in the regulation of tanker safety and poliu-
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1976, § D, at 6, col. 6; id., Dec. 22, 1976, § A, at 1,
coL 3. All quantities of oil spills will be stated in this paper in terms of gallons of oil.
However, oil consumption will be stated in terms of barrels of oil. There arc 42 gallons
in one barrel of oil, and there are approximately 315 gallons in one ton of oil, depending
on the specific gravity of the oil. Porricelli, Keith, and Storch, Tankers and Ecology, 79
TRANsACTIoNs 169, at 171 (1971) (TRANSACTIONS is a publication by the Society of
Naval Architects and Marine Engineers.) [hereinafter cited as Tankers and Ecology].
2. N.Y. Times, Dee. 20, 1976, § D, at 6, col. 6; id., Jan. 4, 1977, at 9, col. 6; d., Jan.
8, 1977, at 8, col. 1; id., Dec. 25, 1976, at 1, col. 1. The Sansinena and the Olympic
Games were, like the Argo Merchant, of Liberian registry. In total, there were nine tanker
casualties in United States waters during this four week period. Except for the Grand
Zenith, all the tankers were of Liberian registry. On December 24, 1976, the Oswego
Peace spilled 250,000 gallons of oil near Groton, Connecticut. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1976.
§ A, at 10, col. 2. The Barcola, with 13,000,000 gallons of oil aboard, went aground
near Texas in the Gulf of Mexico, but was refloated without spilling any of its cargo. N.Y.
Times, § A, Jan. 8, 1977, at 8, col. 2. The empty and aging Chester A. Polway split apart
in gale force winds off Cape Ann, Massachusetts. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1977, § A, at 20,
col. 3. The Amoco Indiana was trapped in the ice in Grand Traverse Bay, Michigan,
carrying 9,702,000 gallons of gasoline and fuel oil. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1977, at 57,
col. 3.
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tion since the age of the huge oil spills began with the grounding of
the Torrey Canyon off the United Kingdom in 1967.8
In the wake of the Torrey Canyon disaster, the United Kingdom
turned to the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) for an international response to the growing problem of
oil pollution of the oceans by tankers.4 IMCO is the only international
organization with jurisdiction over maritime affairs.5 However, this
jurisdiction is advisory and consultative only and IMCO has no direct
regulatory authority over the world's merchant marine.0 Because of
this status, IMCO is limited to drafting and sponsoring various con-
ventions on marine safety and pollution, with the convention provisions
being enforced by those nations that ratified the conventions. 7 IMCO's
response to the Torrey Canyon disaster, through its newly created
3. Arriving from the Persian Gulf, the Torrey Canyon was bound for Milford Haven,
a port in southwestern Wales, and did not enter the English Channel at its widest point.
It hugged the Scilly Islands at a speed of seventeei knots and ran aground on a reef
fifteen miles from the westernmost point of England. The Torrey Canyon was carrying
36,855,000 gallons of Kuwait crude oil, and the entire cargo was spilled into the English
Channel. E. BoRESE & D. KumcER, TAm TrEs oF CANcE: 19 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as BoRcEsE & KsuE E]; Mostert, The Age of the Oilberg, AutmoUN, (May 1975),
at 18. The assumption by the world in general that much had been done about tanker
spills was due to the lack of world-wide publicity concerning tanker casualties. For
example, the grounding of the Metula in the Straits of Magellan in 1974 which resulted
in the second largest tanker oil spill in history (see infra, note 110 and accompanying
text), received little publicity. This is because the spill occurred in a very remote part
of the world and thus did not present much news value. Contrast that with the earlier
Torrey Canyon spill (the largest on record) that occurred in a very iopulated and busy
part of the world. Until the Argo Merchant, almost all tanker casualties have occurred
in areas that do not present much news value world-wide. With the non-reporting of
tanker casualties, the world at large could assume that much had been done to prevent
another Torrey Canyon or, in the alternative, that the Torrey Canyon disaster had been
an isolated incident.
4. See infra, note 18.
5. The basic international law concerning the powers and limits of a nation's legis-
lative and enforcement jurisdiction on the world's oceans is contained in the Law of tie
Sea which is currently being revised. Within the basic structure of the Law of the Sea,
IMCO has been delegated certain powers in the area of international maritime affairs
and the specific problems involved in that field. Thus, there is no conflict ketwecn the
Law of the Sea and IMCO's jurisdiction, rather, they complement each other and there
has been much effort put into coordinating the two areas. Hearings on Ocean Pollution
Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 95-97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Ocean Polltilon].
6. The Convention of the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
6 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 239 U.N.T.S. 48, opened for signature March 6, 1948,
entered into force March 16, 1958 [hereinafter cited as IMCO Convention]; Singh,
International Conventions of Merchant Shipping, 8 BruTisn StuPPiNG LAws (2nd ed.
1973) at 1591 [hereinafter cited as Singh]. Article 2 states: "The functions of the
Organization shall be consultative and advisory."
7. See infra, Part III.
Legal Committee," was thus necessarily limited to drafting conventions
on tanker safety. Even though IMCO acted promptly, none of the
post-Torrey Canyon conventions have yet come- into force, so the
world is not much further along in this area than it was ten years
ago. This paper will discuss IMCO, examine the structure that pre-
vents it from being a truly effective international maritime agency
-and propose recommendations and solutions to existing and foresee-
able problems. To demonstrate the workings of IMCO, the problems
of tankers, as one type of internatiofaal shipping, will be addressed.
The main impediment to effective action by IMCO under its present
structure has been the tendency of maritime nations, ship owners and
ship operators to place their own interests above international concerns.
Furthermore, it has been popular lately to blame the flag of conven-
ience countries for tanker pollution incidents,9 but blame must be
shared, in large measure, by the private maritime companies as well
as the traditional maritime nations.10
IMCO must be delegated more powers by its members to facilitate
8. The 1967 Torrey Canyon grounding and several other well-publicized pollution
incidents in the late 1960s led to parallel legal developments. Internationally, agree-
ments were reached under auspices of IMCO. See infra, note 20. The United States
Congress drew on the already established concepts of ship responsibility for clean-up
costs established by the 1966 Clean Water Act (Pub.L. No. 89-753, § 211(a); 80 Stat.
1252 (1966)) to produce the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 (Pub.L. No.
91-224; 84 Stat. 91 (1970)). For post-Torrey Canyon legislative activity in the United
Kingdom, see Mensab, The Law Relating to Sea Pollution, E vmo trmTAL PoLLu n"o
CONTROL: TEcamCAL, ECoNoac, AN LucAL AsPE-rs 174 (McKnlght, Marstrand, &
Sinclair ed. 1974). South African legislation is discussed in Heyne, Republic of South
Afrlca v. Sea Polluters and Others 2 CoMp. INT'L LAw J. S. Am'. 290 (1969).
9. BORGESE & Knmczn, supra, note 3, at 20; N. MOSTmT, Supmtsiw (1975); Mari-
time Transport Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), MAnTmm Trit.seoar- 1971, 85-109 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
OECD MAin'yra Tn .monr-1971]. A "flag of convenience" nation is defined as the
flag of any country that allows the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled
vessels under conditions which, for whatever reasons, are convenient and opportune
for the persons who are registering the vessels. B. Boczr, FLAS OF Co.vrniL';c 2
(1962). The countries that are considered to fall within this definition are Liberia,
Panama, Cyprus, Singapore, Lebanon, Honduras, Costa Rica, Somalia, Morocco, San
Marino, Haiti, Malta, and Sierra Leone. OECD MAIutrriE Tt.ANsPor-1971, supra, at
87. Since Liberia and Panama have by far the largest fleets of any of these countries
and are the only ones of the flags of convenience that have great numbers of tankers
under their flags, this paper will primarily focus on those two countries. Although this
paper will use the term "flags of convenience" because it is the most well-known term,
these nations have been variously known as "flags of necessity, runaway flags, flags of
refuge, tax-free flags, pirate flags, bogus maritime flags, freebooters, fictitious flags , nom-
inal flags, and flags of attraction." B. Boczrx, FLAcs OF CoNvNtuc;C, supra, at 5-6.
10. As used in this paper, the traditional maritime nations are those nations which
in the past have had large navies and citizens who owned many ships and sailed them
under their owvn nations' flags. These countries include the United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands, France, Spain, Norway, and the United States.
issue IMCO
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international cooperation in solving a major problem of world-wide
concern. Initially, IMCO must call a conference to draft a convention
to establish a system of internationar cooperation in cleaning up spills
of oil and other noxious substances. Secondly, to help prevent spills,
IMCO should be given the power to conduct world-wide tanker in-
spection so that maritime safety and pollution standards will be uni-
formly applied and enforced. Violations would be reported and IMCO
members would then proceed under Article 82 of the final draft of
the new Law of the Sea. 1 Finally, IMCO members should give IMCO
11. The Final Revised Single Negotiating Text of the Law of the Sea (New York,
Oct. 1976, unpublished). Article 82 provides in part:
3. Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are ne-
cessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alla, to:
(a) The construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships;
(b) The manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of
crews, taking into account the applicable international Instru-
ments;
(c) The use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the
prevention of collisions.
4. Such measures shall include those necessary to insure:
(a) That each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate
intervals, is surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships, and has
on board such charts, nautical publications and navigational
equipment and instruments as are appropriate for the safe navi-
gation of the ship;
(b) That each ship is in the charge of a master and offmcers who
possess appropriate qualifications, in particular in seamanship,
navigation, communications and marine engineering, and that
the crew is appropriate in qualification and numbers for the
type, size, machinery and equipment of the ship;
(c) That the. master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the
crew are fully conversant with and required to observe the ap-
plicable international regulations concerning safety of life at
sea, the prevention of collisions, the prevention and control of
marine pollution, and the maintenance of communication by
radio.
5. In taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is
required to conform to generally accepted international regulations, pro-
cedures and practices and to take any steps which may be necessary to
secure their observance.
6. A State which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and
control with respect to a ship have not been exercised may report the
facts to the flag State. Upon receiving such a report, the flag State shall
investigate the matter and, if appropriate, take any action necessary to
remedy the situation.
7. Each State shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably
qualified person or persons into every marine casualty or incident of navi-
gation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing loss
of life or serious injury to nationals of another State or serious damage
to shipping or installations of another State or to the marine environment.
The flag State and the other State shall co-operate in the conduct of any
inquiry held by that other State into any such marine casualty or Incident
of navigation.
certain regulatory powers over tankers whose flag countries belong to
the Organization. Once IMCO's jurisdiction is broadened to include
regulatory powers, the Organization will be able to work more quickly -
and effectively toward the goal of minimal tanker pollution of the
oceans upon which the future of the world depends.
12
I[. THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MAME
CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION
In 1948, the United National Maritime Coiiference in Geneva
drafted a convention to create a U.N. special agency to cover maritime
activities. The Convention of the Inter-governmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization, which established IMCO, came into force in
1959.13 The purpose of IMCO, as stated in Article I of the IMCO
Convention, is to facilitate cooperation between member states in
techniaal matters relating to shipping engaged in international trade.
1 4
However, since IMCO is the only international agency with jurisdic-
tion over maritime affairs, the scope of its activities has expanded over
the past ten years. IMCO has become involved in international law
relating to merchant shipping and also has taken on the complex
problems of marine pollution.15 The Organization has evolved into
an international legal body as well as a consultative organization on
technical maritime matters.
At present, cooperation among governments on technical matters
that affect shipping continues to be one of the main purposes of IMCO.
Its major objective is to achieve the highest practicable standards of
maritime safety and efficient navigation. 0 While the exchange of in-
formation has occurred, IMCO has found that in order to achieve
12. The effects of only about 300 chemical substances introduced into the seas every
day have been studied to any degree. Oil is one substance that has been studied. Among
the areas most heavily affected by oil pollution are the estuaries and offshore waters
which provide food and shelter for the young stages of many commercially important
marine organisms. Most vulnerable to oil is plankton - the basic life of the sea, which
through photosynthesis generates at least one third of the world's oxygen and converts
the water's nutrients into the sugars, starches and proteins upon which all sea creatures
ultimately depend. Many experts warn that unless we stop polluting the seas, life could
be extinguished there within 25 to 30 years. Sxmr.' TonLEy CANYON PoLLunon AN
M.nnE LwE (1968); STRAuRcN, BiowcicALx AND OcrANoclAPmXcAL SuRvEY or TiE
SANTA B~nBaaA CHNmm Om SPmL 1969-70 (1971); NAnoxAL AcAnv n oF ScmNcr.,
PEm-Rorutm IN THE MARINE ENvinoNmENT (1975).
13. Singh, supra, note 6, at 1591.
14. IMCO Convention, art. 1.
15. See infra, Part II.
16. Singh, supra, note 6, at 1588. IMCO also is charged with a special responsibility
for the safety of life at sea.
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uniform world-wide standards, it has had to resort to the use of multi-
lateral conventions through the international legal process.11 In this
sense, IMCO is no longer only consultative, rather, it has become an
agency actively involved in establishing maritime standards.
Pollution of the seas by oil and other noxious substances, originally
a minor part of IMCO's work, has become a major concern of the
organization. IMCO was suddenly. thrust into the oil pollution field
in 1967 with the grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon off the ooast
of the United Kingdom. Thirteen days after the stranding, the United
Kingdom asked the IMCO Council to meet in extraordinary s~ssion, 1
and out of this session came the formation of the IMCO Legal Commit-
tee.19 Since 1967, IMCO has devoted a great deal of effort in this area,
particularly in the drafting and promulgation of various conventions.20
Under Article I of the IMCO Convention, the Organization is
mandated to- discourage discriminatory, unfair, and restrictive prac-
tices afiecting ships in international trade so as to promote the freest
possible availability of shipping.21 In practice this has not been a
significant pat of IMCO's work, but fear of causing a double stand'
ard of enforcement, and hence discrimination, has kept IMCO from
effectively carrying out the other purposes set forth in its convention.2"
The Assembly, the Council, their various committees and the Secre-
tariat comprise the basic organizational structure of IMCO. Eighty-six
member states belong to the Assembly, which meets biennially unless
17. See infra, Part III.
18. IMCO, IMCO BuI.Ixrx No. 11, (1967) at 7; Price, International ActivitU
Regarding Shipboard Oil Pollution Control PREVENTION AND CONmnOL OF OIL S PItas
(American Petroleum Institute, 1971) at 30.
19. IMCO, IMCO Bu=.E-m No. 11, supra, note 18, at 10.
20. The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas In
Cases of Oil Pollutiofn Damage (1969), 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068, entered into
force May 6, 1975; The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage (1969), Singh, supra, note 6 at 1514, not yet in force; The International Con-
'vention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pol-
lution Damage (1971), IMCO, THE ACTIVITIES OF IMCO IN RELATION TO SnIPINO
AN RELATrED MARrTimE MATasRS 23 (1974), not yet in force; The Convention on the
International Regulationg for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972), id. at 12, not yet in
force; The Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pol-
lution by Substances other than Oil (1973), IMCO, IMCO AND ITS ACTIVITIES - IN-
FORMATION SUM11ARY 1974, 51 (1974) [hereinafter cited as IMCO ACTIVITIES], not yet
in force; The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1073),
IMCO, ThE ACTrVrrIEs OF IMCO IN RELATION TO SHIPPING AND RELATED' MAIriME
MATTRS 18 (1974), not yet in force.
21. IMCO. Convention, art. 1(b).
22. Since IMCO sponsored conventions are only enforced by those nations which
ratify them, IMCO has been hesitant to draft stringent maritime regulations for fear
that sporadic enforcement will result in economic discrimination against those States
that require the stricter standards. See infra, note 82 and accompanying text,,
an extraordinary session is called.23 The Assembly must eventually
approve, by majority vote, any action taken by the Organization. In
addition, the Assembly elects the Secretary-General, the members of
the Council and the Maritime Safety Committee.24 Although the As-
sembly is the formal body of IMCO, the real power resides with the
IMCO Council. The eighteen members of the Council are elected
biennially at the regular session of the Assembly. 5 The Council acts
as IMCO's governing body between Assembly sessions and generally
meets twice a year to deal with the legal, financial and personnel mat-
ters of the organization.26 As stated in Article 18 of the IMCO Con-
vention, the eighteen elected members are divided into three groups:
six nations with the largest interest in providing international shipping
services; six nations with the largest interest in international seaborne
trade; and six nations with special interests in maritime affairs and
whose election to the Council will ensure fair representation of all the
major geographical areas of the world.
27
The committees of IMCO do most of the continuing work of the
Organization. The oldest and, at one time the most controversial com-
mittee, is the Maritime Safety Committee.28 Provided for in the text
of the IMCO Convention,29 the committee is composed of sixteen
members, elected to four-year terms. Generally meeting once or twice
a year, it handles all the technical matters relating to maritime safety
and has eleven sub-committees under its jurisdictioii.3
23. Thie figures are as of 1974. Eighty-five nations are full members and Hong Kong
is an associate member. IMCO Acxvrrms, supra, note 20 at 53-61. An extraordinary
session of the Assembly may be called anytime that it is deemed necessary by the
Council, or on a request made to the Secretary-Ceneral by at least one third of the
members. IMCO Convention, art. 14; Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, Rule 2,
IMCO BAsic Docummm 53 (1962).
24. IMCO Convention, arts. 17, 18, 23, and 28; Hearings on Coast Guard Miscel-
laneous Matters before the Subcomm. on the Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey,
and Navigation of the House Commi on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 30 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Coast Guard Misc.].
25. IMCO Convention, art. 19.
26. Hearings, Coast Guard Misc., supra, note 24.
27. IMCO Convention, art. 18.
28. See infra, note 94 and accompanying text.
29. IMCO Convention, art. 28-32.
30. Hearings, Coast Guard Misc., supra note 24. The eleven subcommittees under
the Maritime Safety Committee are Fire Protection, Safety of Navigation, Marine Pol-
lution, Containers and Cargoes, Radio Communications, Life Saving Appliances, Car-
riage of Dangerous Goods, Ship Design and Equipment, Subdivision and Stability,
Safety of Fishing Vessels, and Standard of Training and Watchkeeping. The number
one priority at present for all IMCO subcommittees is the elimination of marine pol-
lution and the determination of how the responsibilities of each specific subcommittee
can effect this goal. Hearings, Coast Guard Misc., supra, note 24, at 31.
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The most important IMCO committee now is the Legal Committee,
established by the Council in 1967 following the Torrey Canyon dis-
aster.31 Prior to that time, IMCO had no formal body to handle the
myriad of legal questions concerning international maritime affairs.
Three related committees are the Facilitation Committee, the Com-
mittee on Technical Cooperation and the Maritime Environment Pro-
tection Committee.32 The latter committee, which is becoming more
important, was created by the Assembly after the United Nations
Conference on the Environment in Stockholm. 3
The IMCO Secretariat is composed of 206 interational civil ser-
vants as of 1976-77, who carry out the Organization's day-to-day func-
tions.3 4 Unlike other United Nations' special agencies, the power of
IMCO is exercised by its members through the Council and not by the
Secretariat. 5
IMCO is funded through contributions by the individual member
states, the assessment being based on each state's percentage of the
total world merchant fleet tonnage.38 Thus the largest merchant marine
states - Liberia, Japan and the United Kingdom - are also the largest
contributors.3 7 The biennial budget is prepared by the Council and
approved by the Assembly.
Article 2 of the IMCO Convention explicitly states that it is
to be a consultative and advisory organization. Therefore, IMCO
has had to resort to indirect means to implement stricter maritime
safety, navigation and pollution standards. Under the Convention,
IMCO has no direct authority; rather, it is left to the individual states
to act on.IMCO suggestions and advice. IMCO has resorted to drafting
various conventions and then calling conferences of its members (to
which non-members are also invited) to hammer out the final terms
of these conventions.3 9 The result is a multi-lateral treaty that becomes
binding on the ratifying states once the convention enters into force.
31. IMCO, IMCO BuLLEXI No. 11, supra, note 18, at 10; IMCO, IMCO ANNUAL
REPORT - 1968 (1968) at 3.
32. IMCO AcTwrimEs, supra, note 20.
33. IMCO, IMCO BuuLniii No. 14 (1972) at 3.
34. IMCO Convention, arts. 33-38; IMCO, AssEmBLY - RIISOLUTIONS AM OInt
DECISiONS, 9th Session (1975).
35. Hearings, Coast Guard Misc., supra, note 24, at 30.
36. Id., at 31.
37. M~arrim ArtimnsATiozN, U.S. DEPARnTmENT or Comwiancg, A STATSTsCAL
ANALYSIS OF THE Womat's MERcHANTr FLEr, (Dec. 31, 1975) 374-375.
38. For the text of Article 2, see supra, note 6.
39. The initial drafting of IMCO sponsored conventions it; usually done by the
IMCO Legal Committee. Singh, supra, note 6, at 1589.
Generally, for an IMCO sponsored convention to come into force it
must be ratified by at least fifteen states of which at least seven must
have a merchant marine of one million or more gross deadweight tons40
This usually means that there is a long time-lapse before signatory
requirements are achieved and a convention comes into force.4' IMCO
has become the forum and sponsoring agency for the promulgation
of conventions that concern international maritime affairs.
IMCO's present consultative status requires the enforcement of
the various conventions be left to the ratifying states. A convention
cannot be enforced until it comes into force, and then it can only be
enforced by ratifying states if they have enacted the necessary domes-
tic implementing legislation.42 Article 1(b) of the IMCO Convention
requires every ratifying state of a convention sponsored by IMCO to
enforce those provisions against a merchant ship of any nation that
enters its territorial waters.43 This is to prevent shipping nations not
party to a convention from receiving a favorable position in interna-
tional seaborne trade through non-compliance. In practice, this does
not prevent ships of non-ratifying states from achieving a more favor-
able economic position because most nations are not ratifying parties
to the conventions. Thus, ships whose flag nations enforce the conven-
tions are at a disadvantage in shipping to non-ratifying states.
I. PRESENT INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
OF TANKERS
IMCO has been responsible for seventeen conventions of which
seven are presently in force.44 Several are important to tanker safety
and pollution control. The oldest of the IMCO sponsored conventions,
and one of the few in force that applies to tankers, is the Convention
on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 45 Construction and design safety
40. See, e.g., The International Convention on Load Lines (1966), art. 28, 18 U.S.T.
1857, T.I.A.S. No. 6331, 640 U.N.T.S. 133; The International Convention on Civil Li-
ability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969), art. XV, supra, note 20.
41. As of 1974, ten of the seventeen IMCO sponsored conventions were not yet
in force. Of those in force, the time gap between promulgation and entry into force
generally has been five years. IMCO AcrlvrriEs, supra, note 20, at 50-52.
42. Hearings, Coast Guard Misc., supra, note 24, at 32.
43. IMCO Convention, art. 1(b). The'Article states that IMCO members are en-
couraged to remove discriminatory actions, obligating IMCO members that are parties
to a convention to enforce the regulations against all merchant vessels entering their
waters.
44. IMCO AcnvrrEs, supra, note 20, at 50M3.
45. 16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27, opened for signature June
17, 1960, entered into force May 26, 1965.
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standards, standards for the training of masters,, pilots, officers and,
to some extent, crews were established. Since tankers have been
plagued by an apparent lack of qualified masters and adequate navi-
gational equipment in working order, the SOLAS convention had to be
amended. Numerous amendments have been made to SOLAS since
1966, but none have yet come into force.40
The International Convention on Load Lines is the other major
IMCO sponsored convention affecting tankers that is presently in
force.47 This convention, among other things, chlnged the load line
requirements for tankers to allow them to carry more oil on one trip,
even in winter seas.
48
The other conventions that affect tanker safety and pollution stand-
ards have all been drafted in the years since the Torrey Canyon disaster
and are not yet in force.49 The International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution by Ships (1973) is one such example.5 0 This
represents IMCO's attempt to set up standards for the prevention of
intentional oil pollution.51 Accidental spills are not covered, nor is
any international system proposed to ensure that standards will be
uniformly enforced.
Another convention, the International Convention Relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties
(1969) ,52 attempts to define when and where a coastal nation may
intervene when a tanker casualty has occurred outside its territorial
jurisdiction but where the spill threatens that nation's coast. The
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
46. IMCO ACrTrrEs, supra, note 20, at 50. Singh, supra, note 6, at 127.
47. 18 U.S.T. 1857, T.I.A.S. No. 6331, 640 U.N.T.S. 133; Singh, supra, note 0, at
58, opened for signature April 5, 1966, entered into force July 21, 1968.
48. N. MOSTERT, SupEnsum 234 (1975).
49. There have been six since 1968 and only one is in force yet. IMCO AcTiviTIEs,
supra, note 20, at 50-52.
50. Id.; N. MOSTERT, SuPERsHnip 376 (1975).
51. Besides accidental oil pollution from tanker casualties, the other major problem
of oil pollution by tankers has been the intentional discharge of oil into the seas.
Tankers and Ecology, supra, note 1, at 174. Of the more than 1,450,000 metric tons
of oil for which tankers are held accountable, 967,000 metric tons enter the sea from
routine tanker operations and the ballasting and cleaning of cargo oil tanks. Id. For
discussions on methods of controlling the intentional discharge of oil see, Hearings,
Ocean Pollution, supra, note 5, at 187-92; Tankers and Ecology, supra, note 1; U.S,
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OIL TnANsroInATIoN BY TANKERS,'
AN ANALYSIS OF MARINE POLLUTION AND SAFETY MEAsurEs 27 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OIL TnANSPORTATION By TANicEIIS].
52. U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068; Singh, supra, note 6, 1506, opened for signature
1969, entered into force May 6, 1975.
(1969)53 and the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971)34
attempt to deal with the problems of liability and compensation for
pollution damage.
Compliance with IMCO conventions and regulations has been spo-
radic because there is no world-wide, uniform system of enforcement.
It is carried out on an ad hoc basis by the parties to the conventions
that are in force. Since IMCO-sponsored conventions are enforced
through domestic legislation of the ratifying states, domestic imple-
mentation of these conventions is necessary. In practice, signatory
states will often ratify but fail to implement a convention.55 Further-
more a nation can be a party to a convention but still operate under
its own domestic laws, which may be more lax than the international
convention. The net result is confusing: some nations ignore the con-
ventions and apply their own laws, if any; some nations are caught in
limbo, with ratification but without domestic implementation; some
nations ratify and implement; and, finally, some nations ratify and then
implement the convention with stronger domestic legislation than was
called for in the original agreement. 50 Members of IMCO do not
automatically become parties to the various conventions, rather, each
convention must be separately ratified. Furthermore, a convention may
not become effective until many years after its promulgation, thus
leaving countries that have ratified and implemented this convention,
technically enforcing through domestic enactments a convention that
has yet to come into force.57
Enforcement of international maritime regulations by individual
nations raises problems other than uniformity of standards. Enforce-
ment varies from country to country depending on its size, resources
and personnel available. For example, the United States, with its Coast
Guard, has extensive resources and personnel at its command to inspect
tankers and cite those that violate safety and pollution standards.55 Yet
53. Id., at 1514, opened for signature 1969, not yet in force.
54. IMCO Ac'nvrEs, supra, note 20, at 52; Singh, supra, at 1522, opened for sig-
nature 1971, not yet in force.
55. Hearings, Coast Guard Misc., supra, note 24, at 32.
56. See infra, notes 80, 81, and accompanying text for an example of where the
United States is implementing stricter standards than are presently called for in the
international conventions. See also N. MosisrT, SurxEstup 379 (1975).
57. Id.
58. Still, the U.S. Coast Guard itself admits that it cannot perform a thorough job,
as even with the resources and personnel available, there is a shortage that prevents
it from conducting the kind of inspection that it would like to do. Hearings, Ocean
Pollution, supra, note 24, at 188.
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the Argo Merchant, though banned from 1st Coast Guard District
off New England waters after several pollution and safety violations
in 1974, was still able to slip into United States' waters on the West
Coast during the following year 5 9 It was upon the tanker's return to
the 1st'Coast Guard District for the first time since its ban that the
Argo Merchant ran aground off Nantucket Island. The Coast Guard
was prepared to follow the ship and board the morning of thle accident.
However, the tanker ran aground three hours before it was to be in-
spected and certified as fit to enter port.00 Earlier action could have
prevented the accidefit, but before the Argo Merchant entered United
States' waters the Coast Guard would have been acting on tenuous
jurisdictional grounds. According to the IMCO Convention on In-
tervention on the High Seas, a country may take action outside its
jusisdiction only if a. spill has occurred.6l
A'problem in the enforcement of international tanker regulations
by individual nations is that self-interest impedes vigorous enforcement.
The industrialized countries require vast quantities of oil and, because
of the location of the major sources, transportation of oil by tanker is
a necessity.6 2 If one country unilaterally were to set much more strin-
gent pollution and safety standards, transportation costs of oil to that
country would increase and its tanker fleet, and to a lesser extent its
oil dependent industries, would be at a competitive disadvantage in
world markets. For years this has been the basic argument of United
States ship owners and operators when confronted with tough mari-
time standards.63 IMCO has attempted to overcome this obstacle by
requiring parties to its conventions to enforce its regulations against
tankers flying any flag if located in the waters of a ratifying state.0 4
However, since the conventions in force do not have a large number
of ratifying states and the more stringent conventions are not yet in
force, sub-standard tankers ply the waters between non-ratifying na-
tions, or, like the Argo Merchant, continue to slip into the waters of
59. Ulman, How the Arcane World of the Argo Merchant, Other Tankers Works,
The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 1977, at 1, col. 1. [hereinafter cited as Ulman, The
Wall Street Journal].
60. Id.
61. The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas In
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (1969), 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068; Singh, supra,
note 6, at 1506.
62. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT, Om. TnANsPOTATION BY TANxmis, supra,
note 51, at 8-16; Luten, The Economic Geography of Energy, ENranY AND POWER
110-11 (Scientific American ed. 1971).
63. Hearings, Ocean Pollution, supra, note 5, at 181.
64. See supra, notes 42, 43, and accompanying text.
signatory nations without inspection or citation.05 As a result, enforce-
ment of the international standards established by IMCO conventions
has yet to resemble a world-wide efficient system.
IV. WHO IS TO BLAME?
Intentional and accidental oil pollution of the oceans by tankers
has generally been blamed on the so-called "flags of convenience. " 6
However, the fault lies not only with them but also with the ship owners
and operators and the traditional maritime nations, who for a myriad
of reasons, have held the "flags of convenience" responsible for the prev-
alence of sub-standard vessels.67 Defining a major maritime nation
has been a source of controversy. During the past twenty-five years
the definition of a major maritime country has undergone tremendous
change even though the standard of measurement, the ownership of a
merchant fleet, continues to be the same.08 Historically a major mari-
time nation was a powerful country whose citizens owned many ships
that were protected by a large navy. Presently countries such as Liberia,
Panama and Cyprus are considered to be "large maritime nations" be-
cause of the size of their merchant fleets without regard to vessel
ownership or adequate naval protection.60 Unlike the past when a
country needed a large merchant marine to supply its domestic needs,
the modem maritime nation generally is engaged in maritime transport
around the world according to the dictates of market demands. The
fleet often is not primarily for the use of its flag country. Any country
can now become a merchant marine power, for the size of a country's
merchant fleet is no longer dependent upon its geographical location,
65. Hearings, Ocean Pollution, supra, note 5, at 96; Ulman, The Wall Street Journal,
supra, note 59.
66. See infra, note 67.
67. In a study in 1971 by the Maritime Transport Committee of the O.E.C.D. there
were listed such reasons as: the flag of convenience nations' unwillingness or inability
to provide enforcement mechanisms for safety and social regulations; the mere formal
certification of masters and officers and the prevalence of non-certified officers; and the
lower than average standards for personnel on merchant vessels. OECD, MIAnrmc
TnA&spoRT-1971, supra, note 9 at 103-06. Among the members of OECD are the
traditional maritime nations. But see Argiroffo, Flags of Convenience and Sub-standard
Vessels: A Review of ILO's Approach to the Problem, 110 I-NTrATiorAL LAIo Ia, -
vIEw No. 5 (Nov. 1974) at 437 where it is stated that there has been a shift of emphasis
of late from the specific yet elusive question of flags of convenience to the more general
and socially significant one of sub-standard vessels wherever they may be registered.
68. For the discussion of the International Court of Justice case see infra, notes 9--101
and accompanying text. The size of the merchant fleet of a nation is based upon the
amount of registered tonnage in that nation.
69. Id.
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size or economic strength. However, these very factors have presented
enforcement problems. Liberia, Panama and other small nations have
limited capabilities to provide effective world-wide enforcement of
maritime regulations.70 Inasmuch as these countries do not require a
substantial maritime trade to maintain their economies, their merchant
fleets rarely visit their home ports where the limited resources and few
inspectors could be most effectively employed.7 1
Despite these limitations, some "flags of convenience" countries try
to make a good-faith effort to enforce IMCO standards. For example,
Liberia has maritime safety inspectors in 120 ports around the world.72
The United States, on the other hand, has Coast Guard inspection in
all United States' ports but does not maintain inspectors overseas.73 Li-
beria, furthermore, has exhibited great concern for developing inter-
national standards through its membership in IMCO, where, pursuant
to that organization's financial'structure, it makes the largest monetary
contribution of any member country.7 4
Ship owners and operators, particularly the tanker companies, are
also responsible for oil spills and must bear a great deal of the blame.
Profit motivates shipping and there always were tremendous profits
to be made in shipping crude oil from one point to another75 A super-
tanker can be capitalized in just a few trips and, at the same time,
carry insurance that rarely is cancelled because of a ship's poor safety
record. 70 Tanker companies historically have maintained a casual at-
70. Flag of convenience countries generally are small in size and population, For
example, Liberia is a country of 43,000 square miles and a population of 2,500,000.
Panama is 32,001 square miles with a population of 1,100,000. See generally, Wormn
ALMANAc, 1975 Wow ALmANAC Boox or FACTs (1975).
71. Only about two percent of the ships of Liberian registry ever call on ports in
Liberia. N. MosTERT, Sumisum, (1975) ch. 3.
72. Liberia presently has 150 inspectors in those ports. Ulman, The Wall Street
Journal, supra, note 59. Liberia set up this system of inspectors partly as a result of
a collision between two Liberian registry tankers in the English Channel In October
of 1970. The subsequent inquiry by Liberia revealed that three oficers on one ship
and four officers on the other ship did not possess Liberian certification and that one
officer had no certification whatsoever. OECD, M.Arrzm ThANsPonu-1971, supra, note
9, at 105.
73. There are two possible reasons for this policy. First, the United States has only
one fifth-as many tankers and about one tenth the tonnage of the Liberian tanker fleet.
Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, A STATiSacAL ANALYSiS OF
TmE Wolim's ME cHANT Fr.ETS (Dec. 31, 1975) 374-75. Second, U.S. tankers have
not been involved in incidents such as the one described in note 72, supra, and have not
been subjected to subsequent world outcry and pressure to do something.
74. See supra, notes 36, 37, and accompanying text.
75. N. MosTERT, SuERsma 86-95 (1975).
76. Janssen, Insurers, Who Pay When Ships Sink, Rarely Suspect, or Talk About,
Fraud, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 1977, at 22, col. 1; Chester, Insurance Aspects
titude toward oil pollution; to them, safety and pollution controls
often are only marginal concerns, if concerns at all.
7
For economic reasons, tanker owners, and ship owners and opera-
tors in general, tend to register their ships under flags of convenience.
In addition to tax benefits, low registry fees and marginal labor costs,
these ship owners take advantage of a small country's limited ability to
enforce maritime regulations.78 If international maritime regulations
were strictly and uniformly enforced, tanker and other ship owners
and operators would have to comply or go out of business. There is
little evidence that the cost of strict enforcement of safety and environ-
mental standards would result in substantially increased oil prices.Y
The enforcement experience of the United States presents a good
example. Brock Adams, the Secretary of Transportation, recently or-
dered stricter safety and environmental standards to be applied to
all tankers that enter United States' waters.80 Tankers that do not meet
the new safety and pollution standards will not be allowed into any
United States' ports until certified to be in compliance. It has been
argued that few tankers not flying the United States' flag would bother
to comply merely to gain entry into United States' ports; most would
ply their trade elsewhere. However, since the United States has become
a leading consumer of Middle Eastern oil, tanker operators do not want
to lose this market. There is still a great deal of money to be made. With
profit as the incentive, that portion of the world tanker fleet that wishes
to benefit from the United States' market will be upgraded and main-
tained at high safety and pollution standards. If the European coun-
tries were to follow the lead of the United States, the oil consuming
countries of the world could "force" most of the world tanker fleet into
compliance. 8'
Tanker companies and other ship owners and operators argue
strenuously against nations unilaterally imposing stricter standards on
their own fleets, because it gives tankers and other vessels registered
under flags that do not maintain strict standards an unfair advantage
in world markets. This argument arose in recent hearings before the
of the Million Ton Tanker, Tim MmijoN ToN C~AruEn (Proceedings of the Super Ocean
Carrier Conference) (1974) at 19; N. Mos'Emr, SupEanms 86-90 (1975).
77. Id.
78. OECD, MxArrnm TnANspoRT-1971, supra, note 9, at 97-102.
79. Hearings, Ocean Pollution, supra, note 5, at 191-92.
80. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1977, § A.
81. This would not solve the problem of substandard tankers because they might
end up plying the backwaters of the world still posing the same threaL'Hearings, Ocean
Pollution, supra, note 5, at 96.
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United States Senate Commerce Committee where the representatives
of American shipping interests strongly argued that the proper place to
establish standards for maritime safety and pollution was at the inter-
national level through IMCO.82 From these statements, it would appear
that tanker and other shipping interests favor an international system
of uniform maritime standards and enforcement when, in fact, it seems
to be a tactic for delaying implementation of stricter standards.
As stated earlier, the present system of implementing IMCO con-
ventions operates very slowly. Only seven of-the seventeen conventions
have come into force, and none of these deal with strict safety and
pollution standards. On the other hand, the Load Lines Convention
is a prime example of how fast IMCO can work when there are strong
forces backing a particular convention. That convention, promulgated
in 1967, altered the previous load lines and set new standards. In this
case, the standards were altered in favor of shipping interests in general
and tanker owners and operators in particular, by permitting tankers
to carry more oil in winter seas than had previously been allowed. 83 As
a result of the tanker and general shipping interests' great irnfluence in
IMCO, this convention was quickly ratified and came into force the
very next year.8 4 By way of contrast, the IMCO Convention itself took
over ten years to come into force.85 Obviously, quick action and prompt
conformance are possible when ship owners and operators stand to
gain. However, the tanker companies have fallen woefully short in
showing any willingness to accept the responsibilities of their business,
if there is no demonstrable profit in it. There is no indication that their
attitudes are going to change voluntarily.
The other major group that must accept part of the blame for the
ever increasing number of tanker casualties is the traditional maritime
nations. Instead of demonstrating a spirit of world-wide cooperation
82. Statement of the American Institute of Merchant Shipping in Hearings, Ocean
Pollution, supra, note 5, at 180.
83. N. MosTEmT, SuPER~sHm 234 (1975).
84. Among the groups having consultative status with IMCO are the International
Chamber of Shipping, International Shipping Federation Limited, International Chamber
of Commerce, European Nitrogen Producers Association, European Council of Chemical
Manufacturer's Federations, Latin American Shipowners Association, Oil Companies
International Marine Forum, and the International Shipowners' Association. See, IMCO,
Assembly - Resolutions and Other Decisions, 9th Session 274-75 (1975).
85. Opened for signature in April 1966, the Convention on Load Lines acquired
the necessary signatures by July of 1967. Pursuant to its Article 28, it came into force
one year later. Contrast the Convention on Load Lines with the IMCO Convention which
took ten years to come into force, the SOLAS Convention which took five years to come
into force, and the two oil pollution conventions of 1969 which have yet to come Into
force.
by helping to establish and enforce strict maritime standards for all
oceans, these countries are more interested in protecting their own
coastlines and economic self-interest. Most of the traditional maritime
nations are reasonably successful in cleaning up oil spills that occur
off their own coasts.86 But not all oil spills happen in territorial waters.
Some drift out to sea rather than towards land. For instance, the oil
slick created by the 7.6 million gallon Argo Merchant spill off Nan-
tucket floated out into the Atlantic Ocean where itis still being carried
by the ocean's currents.8 7 The great consternation caused by the fear
that the oil would wash up on to the Nantucket coast'quickly subsided
when the slick moved out to sea. Undoubtedly, major efforts to clean
up the coastline would have been made, even in winter weather, if the
oil had come ashore, but once the oil moved out to sea no further action
was taken.88 This is just one example of the '"ands off" attitude of the
traditional maritime nations toward cleaning up oil spills on the high
seas. There is an "out of sight, but of mind" sentiment that prevails
until the slick threatens a nation's coast. The tragedy is that oil slicks
cause the same environmental havoc at sea as they do on the coasts.
Nevertheless, no nation officially notices or cares to notice and take
action.
For the past ten years, the traditional maritime nations have blamed
most tanker casualties and consequent spills on the "flags of conven-
ience" countries.8 9 Instead, these maritime powers should be cooperat-
ing with the smaller, newer shipping nations in enforcing maritime
regulations. As long as the animosity toward the "flags of convenience"
continues, the victim will be the marine environment.
The roots of the flag of convenience controversy have their origin
in the post World War II period when countries, such as Liberia and
Panama, offered ship owners tax benefits and no union control over
seamen.90 This provided a strong economic incentive of lower operat-
ing costs for vessel owners who registered their ships under these flags.
Transfer of registry from traditional maritime nations to flags of con-
86. See generally, WARDLEY-Sm m, THE CONTROL OF On. POLLurron (1976).
87. Ulman, The Wall Street Journal, supra, note 59; N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1977, §
A, at 14, col. 6.
88. id.
89. For a recent explanation see Hearings on the National Ocean Policy Study on
Recent Tanker Accidents before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Jan. 12, 1977).. But see note 103, infra. "
90. B. Boczma, FI.&cs OF CoNvEaiENCE 26-63 (1962). For further readings on the
growth of the flags of convenience see NAESS, TrE CanT PAm.mnoN Co.-RovEsY
(1972); MErans, THE NATrONALIT OF SHnms (1967). The classic book on the national-
ity of ships is Ramow, THE TEST OF THE NATzoNA -T OF A MERCHANT VESSEL (1937).
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venience occurred in substantial numbers during the 1950's and many
new ships were similarly registered, primarily under the Liberian and
Panamanian flags.91 Since maritime power had been the traditional
basis for determining the economic stiength and prestige of a nation,
the traditional maritime nations viewed with alarm the decline of their
merchant fleets in proportion to the spectacular growth of the Liberian
and Panamanian fleets . 2 Feelings ran high, for the traditional maritime
powers claimed that their ships had been enticed away ard that the
"flags of convenience" countries were usurpers. The problem came to a
head in 1960 and was- referred to the International Court of Justice."'
Interpretation of Article 28 of the IMCO Convention was the prob-
lem presented to the International Court. When the IMCO came into
existence the first task of the Assembly was to elect member nations to
the Council and Maritime Safety Committee. 4 At the Assembly, a
dispute arose over the meaning of Article 28 which set up a formula
of representation for those members qualified to be elected to the
Committee. Specifically at issue was the interpretation of Article 28(a):
The Maritime Safety Committee shall consist of fourteen Members
elected by the Assembly.from the Members, governments of these
nations having an important interest in maritime safety, of which
not less than eight shall be the largest ship-owning nations .. .1
The European members of IMCO urged the Assembly to adopt an
interpretation of "ship-owning nations" to mean those nations where
the beneficial owners of ships reside.Y0 Liberia and Panama, supported
by the United States and Third World countries, on the other hand
urged that "ship-owning nations" should be defined by the traditional
method, namely, as the nations where the ships are registered.97 The
British resolution, which represented the European view, was passed
by the Assembly. Subsequently, Panama sponsored a resolution to refer
the dispute to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion
under Article 56 of the IMCO Convention."
91. B. BoczFx, supra, note 90, at 26-63. For example, 84 percent of American-owned
ships are registered under a foreign flag. Hearings on Ports and Waterways before tha
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., (March 2,-3, 1976).
92. B. BoczEK, supra, note 90, at 1-25.
93. Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Coinmittee of the
Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Oiganization, [1960 I.C.J. 150.
94. B. Boczmc, supra, note 90, at 126-29.
95. IMCO Convention, art. 28 was amended in 1965. Singh, supra, note 0, at 1595.
96. B. Bocz~, supra, note 90, at 131.
97. Id.
98. Id., at 137.
The International Court ruled that in determining the eight largest
ship-owning nations, the traditional method of cQuntry of registry was
to be used and, therefore, IMCO had violated its own Convention by
refusing to elect Liberia and Panama to the Maritime Safety Com-
mittee.99 The Court pointed out that Article 60 of the IMCO Conven-
tion would come into force once seven nations with a gross tonnage
of one million tons or more had signed, required the determination
to be made on the basis of country of registry. 100 The Court further
ruled that the eight largest ship-owning countries ipso facto had an
important interest in maritime safety, and that the Assembly did not
have any discretionary power in the selection.' 0 1
The International Court's advisory opinion established the right
of the "flags of convenience" countries to be considered as legitimate
maritime nations. Even though the Court seemed to uphold only the
customary international method of determiniiig the size of a nation's
merchant fleet, in fact, this opinion changed the age-old concept of
what constituted a maritime nation. Accordingly, a major maritime
nation need no longer have a large navy and merchant fleet to serve
its own interests, but can have a large merchant marine that serves
the needs of many countries.
Reacting to the ascendancy of the "flags of convenience," tradi-
tional maritime countries have been quick to note the involvement of
a vessel of Liberian or Panamanian registry in a tanker casualty and
to publicize that fact. Liberia did have the greatest number of tanker
losses between 1964 and 1976 but it also has by far the largest tanker
fleet.10 2 Its loss ratio, however, was less than that of four of the major,
traditional maritime nations.10 3 Instead of trying to assess blame the
traditional maritime nations should take on a larger share of the re-
sponsibility for the uniform enforcement of tanker safety and pollution
standards and should cooperate to provide quick action whenever and
wherever spills occur.
-99. [1960] I.C.J. 171.
100. [1960] I.C.J. -169.
101. [1960] I.C.J. 161.
102. Liberia, with 1014 tankers, has twice as many tankers under its flag as Japan,
the country with the second largest tanker fleet, which numbers 581. Liberia also has
by far the greatest tanker tonnage. Mnrxm-m ADM'rNisTATioN, U.S. D'AnrxtF_,r oF
COmmmRC, A STATIICAL ANALYsts oF =rr WoR's M.Rc ,Nr FL.ar (Dec. 31,
1975) at 375.
103. Hearings on the National Ocean Policy on Recent Tanker Accidents before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Testimony of A. McKenzie
of the Tanker Advisory Center. The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Greece all had worse
loss ratios.
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The traditional maritime nations are among the largesi oil con-
suming nations in the world'0 4 and are the main reason for the inter-
national seaborne transport of huge quantities of oil. It is the duty of
the oil consuming nations, in cooperation with the various flag nations
of tankers, to work together to prevent and clean up oil spills through-
out the world. Since the major oil consuming nations are, for the
most part, the traditional maritime nations, it is imperative that these
countries work with the newer maritime nations to achieve a mutu-
ally acceptable solution to the problem of tanker .casualties and the
subsequent oil spills.
V. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF IMCO IN THE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TANKERS
IMCO's effectiveness as an international instrument in the pre-
vention and clean-up of oil spills is hampered by lack of enforcement
powers, as well as inadequate and ineffectively applied international
maritime safety and pollution standards. This situation has been dra-
matically emphasized with respect to the regulation of oil tankers.
IMCO has the potential to be very effective in this field in all aspects
of international shipping. If the world's oceans are to survive the next
few decades of oil transportation, IMCO must immediately promulgate
a convention for international cooperation in the clean-up of oil spills.
Further, IMCO must be given inspection and regulatory powers by its
members and increased funding must be provided to carry out these
new functions. Although the Ninth Assembly of IMO more than
doubled appropriations over the previous biennium for the period
1976-77,1°5 IMCO continues to have the smallest budget of any agency
under the United Nations. l 06 In order to raise additional funds, IMCO
may have to realign its present financial structure or reach some com-
promise within the present system where the traditional maritime na-
tions will have to cooperate more fully with the new maritime countries
that make the largest contributions to the Organization.
104. Luten, The Economic Geography of Energy, Emncv AND Powmi (Scientifo
American ed. 1971) at 110-11. N. MOSTERT, SUPERsHIP 25-27 (1975).
105. Hearings, Coast Guard Misc., supra, note 24, at 31. IMCO's appropriations have
increased over the years. Its appropriations for its first biennium, 1959-61, were $720,000
(See IMCO, AssEmmLY - RESOLUTIONS AD OTHER DEcisIONS, 1st Sess.). For the 1976-
77 biennium the appropriations total $11,129,400 (See IMCO, AssEmBLY - RnsoLUTIONS
Am OTHER DEcisioNs, 9th Sess.).
106. Total appropriations for the 1974-75 biennium were $5,895,500. (See IMCO,
ASSEMBLY - RESOLUTIONS AND OTHERI DECISIONS, 8th Sess.) Appropriations for the
1976-77 biennium total $11,129,400 (See IMCO, ASSEMBLY - RESOLUTIONS AND OmnM
DEcISIONS, 9th Sess.).
In addition to'finding new sources of funding, IMCO must give
top priority to the drafting and promulgation of a convention to
establish international cooperation in the clean-up of oil spills wherever
and whenever they occur. Liability for a particular spill can be as-
sessed to the country or company at fault once that spill no longer
threatens fragile ecosystems. The highest priority is to clean up oil
spills as quickly as possible. Currently, the country off whose coast an
oil spill occurs assumes the lion's share of responsibility for cleaning
up. 0 7 The system is acceptable where the nation is both capable and
willing to clean up its coast. But if the spill drifts out to sea or takes
place off the coastline of a country without clean-up capability, the
present "hands off" attitude of nations must be abandoned in favor of
cooperation.
Today, when spills happen off the coast of a country such as the
United States, the necessary personnel, equipment and money are
availa le to contend with a sizable spill. Countries such as South Africa
and Indonesia are not as well equipped to cope with a problem of
such magnitude, yet much-used tanker routes lie in the dangerous
waters off their coasts. Countries located at crucial points, such as the
Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Malacca, import very little oil
but their coasts are exposed to enormous tanker traffic.108 By default,
these countries must cope with oil pollution by tankers that never
enter their ports.100 This is too great a burden to impose on such
countries. Instead, the oil exporting, consuming and shipping nations
should be mad- to assume that responsibility through an IMCO spon-
sored convention. Thus, those who are responsible for the spills would
cooperate through an international mechanism in cleaning up the be-
leagured coastlines of helpless nations. The international mechanism
should likewise be utilized for spills that do not directly affect coast-
lines but linger at sea.
Since there is no international convention to provide for coopera-
tion in cleaning up oil spills, joint operations are ad hoc and only
107. A country off whose coast a spill occurs has a great stake in protecting its
coastline from despoilation. One small step has been taken to lessen that load by trying
regional cooperation. See, The Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution
of the North Sea by Oil, wherein the nations bordering the North Sea agree to co-
operate. Singh, supra, note 6, at 1492.
108. Luten, The Economic Geography of Energy, EaEGy Am Powam, supra, note
61. In 1972, 8,543,000 barrels of oil per day were moving around the Cape of Cood
Hope, and 5,895,000 barrels of oil per day were moving through the Straits of Malaea.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssF ssEm'r, Omr TnANSPORTATiON ay TANxcns, supra, note
104, at 11.
109. N. Mosimtr, SurasHw 273-78 (1975).
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effective if the spill is, so to speak, in the right place at the right time.
A good example of ad hoc cooperation occurred between Chile and the
United States' ' 0 after the Metula ran aground in the Straits of Magellan
in 1974.111 Fortunately, the Law of the Sea Conference was being
held in Caracas, Venezuela, when the Metula ran aground. The dele-
gates were informed of the accident by Chile, and the United States
promptly notified its Coast Guard." 12 The United States Coast Guard
has three strike forces with sophisticated equipment whose mission is
to handle any marine pollution incident that occurs in United States'
waters."" Because of the Coast Guard's pollution control capability,
the United States Department of State offered the Coast Guard's serv-
ices, on a cost reimbursable basis, and Chile accepted. 14 With the
combined efforts of Chile, the United States and private salvage com-
panies, three-quarters of the Metula's cargo was saved and the ship
was refloated.11 5 However, the 16.8 million gallons of oil that were
spilled were never cleaned up. Since much of the oil floated out into
the oceans, very little effort was made to clean it up. Even if some effort
had been made, very little could have been done since almost no equip-
ment was quickly and readily available."' The Metula effort, while
pointing out the problems of international cooperation in cleaning up*
oil spills, should not be minimized. It represents a genuine collaboration
and the complete loss of the Metula's cargo was prevented.
The new IMCO convention should adopt a strike force modelled on
the United States Coast Guard strike force. Such teams, tinder IMCO
auspices, would be ready to respond quickly and effectively with sufli-
cient personnel and equipment to handle a major tanker casualty when-
ever it occurs. With funding provided by member nations, countries
such as Indonesia and South Africa would no longer have to carry the
burden of cleaning up the oil spills of others. Such a convention would
also create, for the first time, an international mechanism to clean up oil
spills that take place in international waters. Liability for a spill could
be assessed after a clean-up effort in conjunction with the International
110. Canada, Sweden, and IMCO also sent observers. Mostert, The Age of the Oil-
berg, AUDUBON 30 (May 1975).
111. Id., at 35.
112. 1(., at 31; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OIL TRANSPORTATION BY TANK-
ER, supra, note 51, at 170.
113. Id., at 171; Mostert, The Age of the Oilberg, AUDUiON 32 (May 1975).
114. Id.; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OIL TRANSPORTATION BY TANKEII,
supra, note 51, at 171.
115. Id., Mostert, The Age of the Oilberg, AuDUBoN 33 (May 1975).
116. Id., at 35.
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, T1 and the In-
ternational Convention on the Establislment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage.11 The scope of the clean-
up convention should include cleaning up spills of chemicals, fertilizers
and other noxious substances. This convention would be an essential
first step that should be taken by IMCO immediately if the world's
oceans and coastlines are to be saved.
In order to prevent oil spills through tanker compliance with strict
maritime safety and pollution standards, the IMCO Convention should
be amended to give IMCO the responsibility for world-wide, uniform
inspection of tankers.11 As has been stated earlier, the biggest problem
in the field of tanker regulation has been the inadequate, uneven in-
spection and enforcement throughout the world of the various maritime
safety and pollution standards now in effect. 20 The United States Coast
Guard has one of the best systems of inspection and could serve as a
model for world-wide inspection procedures by IMCO. However, even
it is far from perfect and is only applied to ships entering United States'
ports.12 ' An international inspection system under IMCO would elimi-
nate the unnecessary duplication of inspectors of flag countries in every
port. A small country, such as Liberia, with a large merchant fleet that
has few of its vessels call at any of its own ports, should not have to
establish its own system of world-wide inspection.
Another advantage to having an international agency in charge
of tanker inspection would be a world-wide communications network
that would relay information on sub-standard tankers. Member nations
would refuse entry into their ports until sub-standard tankers were
brought into conformance. Nations could retain existing inspection
methods for their own ports, but nations would be relieved of individual
responsibility for world-wide inspection.
It should be noted that the Final Revised Single Negotiating Text
for the new Law of the Sea places some duties on the flag nations.
-2 2
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The Negotiating Text would not conflict with the proposed IMCO
inspection powers because the new Law of the Sea deals with the
problem as it exists today. If flag nations agree to establish an inter-
national authority to carry out world-wide inspections, the Law of the
Sea would still define the duties of flag states not pre-empted by new
amendments to the IMCO Convention. 2 8 IMCO inspectors would take
oVer the responsibility of tanker inspection and would notify the flag
state and the tanker owner or operator of any violations. The respon-
sible country would then take charge. Such a world-wide system of
tanker inspection is a necessary step -toward controlling marine pol-
lution. IMCO, as the international organization with jurisdiction over
maritime affairs, is the agency that must act if anything is to be done.
The strongest step that nations could take would be to amend
Article 2 and other appropriate articles of the IMCO Convention to
change its status so as to include regulatory powers with its present
consultative and advisory functions. Giving regulatory poweri to a
United Nation's agency is not unique. For instance, the United Nations
gave regulatory power over international airspace and airports to the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 124 The ICAO was
established by treaty, with a mandate to write its own regulations and
forms of compliance. 125 IMCO needs a similar mandate to regulate
ports and international waters.
International transportation of oil by tanker has changed drastically
since the IMCO Convention was drafted in 1948. At that time, tankers
were small and the amount of oil transported by sea was not large.12(l
Starting in the 1960's the industrialized nations began importing vast
amounts of Middle Eastern oil and the supertanker has emerged .on
the international scene. 12T As has been shown, the world had never
been confronted with a large-scale oil spill until 1968 and IMCO was
123. This is under general rules of treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30(3) and 30(4)(a). The Convention was
opened for signature on May 23, 1969. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 39/27.
124. Convention on International Civil Aviation, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 29.
Articles 43-47 cover the Organization.
125. Id. Article 47 states, "The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each con-
tracting State such legal capacity as may be necessary for the performance of its fune-
tions. Full judicial personality shall be granted wherever compatible with the consti-
tution and laws of the State concerned." Compare this with Article 2 of the IMCO
Convention in note 6 supra.
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not prepared to deal with the problem.'2 8 It is clear that international
maritime conditions have changed since IMCO was created and that
the agency is hampered by a restrictive Convention in solving present
day problems. IMCO members must amend the IMCO Convention to
give the agency some flexibility and power to expand its jurisdiction
so-that it can deal directly and effectively with the world problem of
tanker regulation. Unlike ICAO, where nations were dealing with a
new mode of transportation and thus were willing to grant regulatory
powers, transportation by sea is very old and established. Traditionally,
nations have had complete power over their fleets and maritime power
was a sign of economic strength and prestige. Although the definition
and importance of a large merchant marine is changing, states still
view their merchant fleets as an immutable part of their sovereign
power. It is necessary to convince the traditional maritime powers that
international regulation is essential to the survival of the oceans on
which mankind depends.
Though a difficult proposition, international regulation of tankers
is a necessity. Ocean pollution, especially by tankers, is a grave prob-
lem that must be solved. Leaving the solution to individual states has
not, thus far, cleansed any international waters. Nor will the pollution
problem disappear when oil runs out some time during the next few
decades, for tankers and vessels of super-tanker size will be carrying
vast quantities of liquified natural gas, chemicals, fertilizers, and other
noxious substances. 12 9 Thus, any powers granted to IMCO would
neither be too little nor too late; tanker spills are a problem that will
remain for some time to come.
Among the regulatory powers that should be granted to IMCO is
the capacity to promulgate stricter maritime safety and pollution stand-
ards without the need to convene a separate conference and draft a
convention on each aspect of the subject matter. There should also
be enforcement powers given to IMCO so that there would be world-
wide uniformity in the application of standards. International enforce-
ment by IMCO, in conjunction with those individual states that would
enforce their own regulations within their territorial waters, would
provide necessary and effective enforcement of maritime standards.
The key to international regulation is the willingness of the maritime
nations to put aside their differences and, in cooperation -with IMCO,
strive toward the goal of pollution-free oceans.
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